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THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE:
JUSTIFIED RELUCTANCE OR DERELICTION OF DUTY?
Cathy J. Lewis*
I. INTRODUCTION
Environmentalists are all too aware of the failures and shortcomings
of federal natural resource preservation, conservation, and management
statutes. The narrow scope,' limited applicability,2 and conflicting man-
dates3 of these laws render them weak ammunition in the war against
destructive resource extraction and development practices. The weaknesses
of the federal statutes are exacerbated by defendants' arsenal of litigation
* Law Clerk to Hon. Richard F. Cebull, United States District Court, District of Montana.
J.D., 1997, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT., M.F.A., Theater Arts, University of
California, Davis; B.A., Theater Arts, Humboldt State University, Arcata, CA. The author wishes to
thank Professors Carl Tobias and Raymond Cross for their criticism and encouragement. All opinions
expressed and any errors are the author's alone.
1. Concededly, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1994), is a for-
midable tool which has halted, at least temporarily, multi-million dollar projects and industrial practic-
es. See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 172 (1978) (halting a nearly completed
dam to save listed fish); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for a Great Ore., 515 U.S.
687, 695 (1995) (upholding restrictions on logging of old-growth forests where listed birds nest and
live); Pacific Rivers Council v. Thomas, 30 F.3d 1050, 1056 (9th Cir. 1994) (halting injurious extrac-
tive activities until ESA-mandated biological consultation for listed salmon was completed). However,
the ESA reaches only listed species. Because so many endangered species are not listed, and because
other creatures which arguably deserve protection are not threatened or endangered by ESA standards,
the scope of the ESA is quite limited. See J.B. Ruhl, Biodiversity Conservation and the Ever-Expand-
ing Web of Federal Laws Regulating Nonfederal Lands: Time for Something Completely Different?, 66
U. CoLO. L. REV. 555, 589 (1995) (explaining that the narrow scope of the ESA renders it too "inflex-
ible" to further a comprehensive "biodiversity conservation policy").
2. Federal statutes control only federal lands and resources, or federally licensed or permitted
activities on non-federal land. In permitting cases, courts have limited the potential reach of some fed-
eral statutes. See, e.g., California Trout v. Schaefer, 58 F.3d 469, 474 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that a
canal project needing a federal wetlands permit, required an EIS only for the wetlands, not for the
entire project, based on court's interpretation of 16 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(c) of the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA)).
3. For example, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) requires the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) to allow resource extraction activities, yet also requires BLM to protect
the environment. See 43 U.S.C. § 1702(c) (1994) (requiring BLM to allow multiple uses [mining,
grazing, ete.] without "permanent impairment of the quality of the environment'). Such conflicting
mandates have frustrated environmentalists and courts for decades. See, e.g., National Wildlife Federa-
tion v. Morton, 393 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1975) (FLPMA challenge to off-road vehicle use on feder-
al lands).
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strategies, such as challenges to environmental plaintiffs' standing,' and
claims of vested property rights to extraction activities.5 Plaintiffs are also
frustrated by the highly deferential standards of judicial review of agency
actions6 and the inadequate relief afforded by the federal statutes.7
Enter the public trust doctrine. This judically-created doctrine, with
ancient roots, could provide the ammunition a court may use to prevent
private control of waters and associated resources that are needed for
public purposes.8 Once a court characterizes a resource as a public trust
resource, the court may apply the doctrine to protect that resource from
environmentally harmful extraction, harvest, diversion, or other use activi-
ties immune to statutory redress. The public trust doctrine may survive
challenges to standing, defenses such as estoppel, and may even defeat or
limit the property rights of long-time property owners, leaving them no
claim for compensation. For these reasons, commentators have argued for
nearly thirty years that the public trust doctrine should be used more often
by plaintiffs and applied more willingly by courts to halt or mitigate envi-
ronmentally adverse actions.
Professor Joseph Sax, whose 1970 article9 is touted as one of the
"most cited" law review articles,"0 was the first to argue for the vigorous
application of the public trust doctrine to protect natural resources, when
4. See, e.g., Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 900 (1990) (denying stand-
ing to plaintiffs who wished to challenge the BLM's land withdrawal review procedures because, inter
alia, plaintiffs were not threatened by imminent injury).
5. See, e.g., Utah Int'l, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F Supp 976, 986-87 (D. Colo. 1980) (holding that
mining company had a vested right to a preferential coal lease, and that the new regulations under
which BLM withheld the lease were impermissibly applied).
6. See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 375-76 (1989) (find-
ing Ninth Circuit's use of the "reasonable" standard, when reviewing an agency's decision not to pre-
pare an EIS, as opposed to the more deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard, was error).
7. For example, despite its sweeping, pro-environment stated purposes, NEPA has been con-
strued as being only a procedural statute, mandating no substantive outcomes. See, e.g., Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989) (finding that NEPA requires agency to
fulfill certain procedural requirements, but once those requirements are satisfied, it is irrelevant that a
challenged ski resort will annihilate an entire herd of
deer).
8. A. DAN TARLOCK, JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT 405 (4th ed. 1993).
9. Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial In-
tervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 473 (1970) [hereinafter Sax I]. Sax is presently Counselor to Secretary
of Interior Bruce Babbitt, was professor of environmental regulation at the University of Califormia,
Berkeley, and has authored more than 100 articles on natural resources and property rights. Joseph L.
Sax, Proposals for Public Law Reform: Sorting Out the Good, the Bad and the Indifferent, 3
HASTINGS N.-N.W J. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 187 n.a (1996).
10. Sax's article was included in a list of the 49 most frequently cited law review articles in the
40 years prior to the publication of the list in 1985. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles, 73 CALIF L. REV. 1540, 1549-53 (1985). In light of the absence of public trust cases prior to




other claims would not suffice. Following in Sax's footsteps, commenta-
tors have argued for the application of the public trust doctrine to solve
the problems of nonpomt water pollution, a problem not effectively ad-
dressed by existing pollution control statutes," and as a means of protect-
ing otherwise unprotected, vulnerable wildlife 2 and fish. 3 Commen-
tators have urged that application of the public trust doctrine could help
save entire aquatic or riparian ecosystems. 4 One author boldly argued
that through application of the public trust doctrine, courts may change the
very presumptions upon which our property laws are based. 5
But not since noted public lands scholar Charles Wilkinson, in 1980,
urged the application of the public trust doctrine by federal courts, 6 has
the argument for vigorous federal application of the doctrine been made.
Perhaps this is because of the continued reluctance of the federal courts to
embrace this doctrine. However, as pressures increase upon those dwin-
dling public resources still under federal ownership or control, there is a
need for the courts to accept and apply the doctrine now, more than ever
before. Therefore, this paper will take up Wilkinson's torch, and argue
that the reluctance of the federal courts is unnecessary
Because the application of the public trust doctrine is most fully
developed in cases involving water rights and the right to use water-relat-
ed resources, this paper will focus upon that aspect of the doctrine, and
leave to others to urge its application in cases involving other resources,
such as non-aquatic wildlife and and public lands.
Section II of this paper discusses, briefly, the development of the
public trust doctrine m the United States. Section III highlights, again
briefly, the successful use of the public trust doctrine in state courts to
overcome the shortcomings, for environmental plaintiffs, inherent in statu-
tory claims. Section IV argues that in cases challenging a federal agency's
approval or licensing of a private activity, federal courts may utilize the
public trust doctrine to protect otherwise unprotected, water-related re-
11. See Ralph W. Johnson, Water Pollution and the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 485
(1989).
12. See Gary D. Meyers, Variation of a Theme: Expanding the Public Trust Doctrine to Include
Protection of Wildlife, 19 ENVTL. L. 723 (1989).
13. See Scott W. Reed, Fish Gotta Swim: Establishing Legal Rights to Instream Flows Through
The Endangered Species Act and The Public Trust Doctrine, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 645 (1992).
14. See Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway, Protection of Biodiversity Under The Pub-
lic Trust Doctrine, 8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21 (1994).
15. See Timothy Patrick Brady, "But Most of It Belongs to Those Yet to Be Born:" The Public
Trust Doctrine, NEPA, and the Stewardship Ethic, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 621 (1990) (arguing
that the concept of property interests in such resources as fish could not exist in a public trust doctri-
naire society).
16. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L.
REv. 269 (1980).
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sources. As a vehicle for the argument, the New World Mine controversy
will be used to address the legal principles which have precluded applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine in some federal cases. Section IV seeks to
demonstrate that these principles need not prevent a federal court from
applying the doctrine in appropriate cases. Finally, Section V concludes
that environmental plaintiffs should more actively urge, and the federal
judiciary should more willingly embrace the public trust doctrine to pro-
tect valuable public resources.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
Early rumblings of the public trust doctrine in the United States could
be heard in two early Supreme Court cases, Martin v Waddell's Lessee7
and Pollard's Lessee v Hagan."5 In those cases, the Supreme Court first
held that the "absolute right" to navigable waters, and the soils under
them, passed to the states upon admission to the union, for the "common
use" of the "people."' 9
Any doubts about the responsibilities imposed upon, and the powers
lodged in, the states by virtue of the states' sovereignty over their waters,
were silenced in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v Illinois."0 In Illinois
Central, the Illinois legislature had granted virtually the entire waterfront
area of Chicago to the Illinois Central Railroad. Later, having second
thoughts, the legislature sought to rescind the grant, and the lawsuit en-
sued. The Court found that the state held title to the land under Lake
Michigan in trust for the people, so that the people might navigate and
fish upon the waters.2 Thus, the Court held that the state could not con-
vey the lands in such a manner that the public's right of access was de-
stroyed. The state could, however, convey parcels of trust land to private
individuals, but only if the effect of the conveyance was to enhance the
public's rights." The doctrine, as stated by Justice Field, made clear that
the states may only "use or dispose of' the trust land "when that can be
done without substantial impairment of the interest of the public in the
waters 1123
After Illinois Central, the public trust doctrine languished for about
fifty years.24 Beginning in the 1940's, the doctrine re-emerged, always
17. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367 (1842).
18. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845).
19. Martin, 41 U.S. at 410 (as to the original 13 states); Pollard's, 44 U.S. at 229 (as to subse-
quently admitted states).
20. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
21. !d. at 452.
22. Id. at 452-53.
23. Id. at 435.
24. No public trust cases were reported from 1893-1944.
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based on state common law, and always in its traditional form.' Finally,
after the California Supreme Court tested the outer bounds of the doctrine,
and especially following the publication of Joseph Sax's influential arti-
cle, 6 the doctrine was creatively applied in state and federal courts. Sax,
relying on Illinois Central, argued for an expansive version of the doc-
trine. He argued that when
the government granted to some private interest the authority to make
resource-use decisions which may subordinate broad public resource
uses, a court might appropriately interpose a flat legal prohibition
on the ground that the state has divested itself of its general regulatory
power over a matter of great public importance.'
Urged on by environmental plaintiffs, a handful of federal and many state
courts embraced Sax's argument, and the era of the modem public trust
doctrine began.
III. THE STRENGTH OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN STATE COURTS
Beginning in the 1970's, case reporters began to fill with decisions of
the states' highest courts fleshing out the modem public trust doctrine.
Plaintiffs successfully invoked the doctrine time and time again to stave
off the greedy or harmful proposed uses of state water, waterbodies, wa-
tercourses, and their related resources. As developed, the doctrine proved
to be an effective tool for judicial oversight and mitigation of the envi-
ronmentally harmful actions of private interests and complacent state agen-
cies.
In 1971, the California Supreme Court boldly and expansively inter-
preted the doctrine in Marks v Whitney.2" In Marks, the court held that
the filling and development of tidelands, granted to the defendant by the
Governor in 1874, did not extinguish the public trust easement. Instead,
the land remained encumbered with the servitude to the extent necessary
to allow public access to the tidelands.29 What was remarkable about the
case was the court's broad-minded statement that the public trust doctrine
25. From 1945 to 1970, the application of the public trust doctrine was quite consistent, if
mundane, for the courts did not extend the doctrine's reach. See, e.g., Niagara Falls Power Co. v.
Duryea, 57 N.Y.S.2d 777, 787 (N.Y. 1945) (finding trust allowed state to charge a private power com-
pany for the water it used, without disrupting a vested property right); Crary v. State Highway
Comm'n, 68 So. 2d 468, 471 (Miss. 1953) (state may build bridge over landowner's oyster bed with-
out effecting a taking because, even though oyster farming was a public use, the bridge was an "addi-
tional" public use).
26. Sax I, supra note 9; see also supra note 10.
27. Sax I, supra note 9, at 562.
28. 491 P.2d 374 (Cal. 1971) (en bane).
29. Id. at 380.
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protects recreational, ecological, and preservation values in tidelands, not
merely fishing and navigation rights, as the more limited, traditional view
has held:
The public uses to which tidelands are subject are sufficiently flexible to
encompass changing public needs. In administering the trust the state is
not burdened with an outmoded classification favoring one mode of uti-
lization over another.1
Building upon the concepts developed in Marks, the most well-known
and influential of all state public trust cases is National Audubon Society
v Superior Court of Alpine County.3 The City of Los Angeles had di-
verted water from the eastern slope of the Sierras to such an extent that
the water level of the ecologically unique Mono Lake had dropped dra-
matically The drop substantially increased the salinity of the lake, turned
islands into peninsulas, and otherwise harmed this important nesting and
feeding sanctuary for migratory birds.32 The plaintiffs challenged the
magnitude of the state's grant of water appropriation rights to Los Angel-
es. The California Supreme Court found that the public trust doctrine
required the state to continuously manage and protect its navigable waters
and the lands beneath, and that the doctrine prevented Los Angeles from
claiming a vested right to appropriate water, leaving the city without a
claim for a compensable taking." Finally, the court held that the public
trust doctrine required the lower court, in deciding the amount of water to
be diverted from Mono Lake, to balance the needs of Los Angeles and the
needs of the lake ecosystem.34
National Audubon opened the floodgates for the public trust doctrine,
and the case is cited in nearly all subsequent public trust cases. Almost
every state has articulated some version of the doctrine, and many states
have enshrined the public trust doctrine in their constitutions 3 or stat-
utes.36 State courts rely upon these proclamations or upon a common law
30. Id.
31. 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (en banc).
32. Nests became vulnerable to predation when land bridges to the islands were formed, and
fish, insects, and other aquatic life were perishing from the increased salinity. Beyond that, the surface
area of the lake had greatly diminished. Id. at 711.
33. Id. at 723-24.
34. Id. at 732.
35. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (providing that wherever occumng in their natural
state, fish, wildlife, and waters are reserved to the people for their common use); LA. CONST. art. IX,
§§ 1, 7 (requiring state to protect, conserve, and replenish all natural resources, including the wildlife
and fish of the state, for the benefit of its people).
36. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113-133 (1995) (providing that the enjoyment of the state's
resources belongs to all of the people of the state); see also Ravalli County Fish & Game Ass'n. v.
Montana Dept. of State Lands, where the court found, based on Montana's Environmental Policy Act,
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articulation of the doctrine, when no state statute or constitution includes
the concept.
Subsequent to National Audubon, a California court was again called
upon to settle a dispute over the diversion of water from Mono Lake. In
California Trout, Inc. v California Water Resources Control Board, the
court broadened the application of California's public trust doctrine by
requiring a reduced diversion of water from Mono Lake's feeder streams,
even though the streams were not legally navigable.a7 The court rejected
the defendants' argument based on the traditional view of the doctrine as
covering only navigable streams or coastal water bodies influenced by the
tide?' Moreover, the court held that a statute of limitations may not bar a
public trust claim "for the same reasons that one may not acquire an inter-
est in public lands by means of adverse possession."39 The court stated
that this concept also applied to the defense of estoppel as against the
state, because "[t]he public is not to lose its rights through the negligence
of its agents 4"o
Other states' courts have built upon the foundation laid by California.
The Idaho Supreme Court utilized the equal access power of the public
trust doctrine in Kootenai Environmental Alliance v. Panhandle Yacht
Club.4' The court held that the public trust doctrine provided the plain-
tiffs with the grounds to challenge the state's grant of a permit to build an
exclusive club on the shores of Lake Coeur d'Alene. Applying the lan-
guage of Illinois Central, the court articulated a test for the validity of a
grant of trust property- the grant must "aid navigation, commerce, or other
trust purposes," and must not "substantially impair the public interest in
the lands and waters remaining."'42 The test establishes "the outer bound-
aries of permissible government action with respect to public trust resourc-
es. ' 43 Ultimately, the court found the yacht club passed the two-part test,
but cautioned that "the grant remains subject to the 'public trust,"' which
allows the state to determine "in the future that this conveyance is no lon-
ger compatible with the public trust."' Thus, no vested right to any per-
which places a trust duty on state agencies to protect the environment, that the state must consider the
harm to wild sheep when deciding whether to grant a permit allowing potentially disease-carrying
domestic sheep to graze near wild sheep on state forest lands. 903 P.2d 1362, 1368 (Mont. 1995).
37. 255 Cal. Rptr. 184, 211, 213 (1989) ("[Public trust interest pertains to non-navigable
streams which sustain a fishery.").
38. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 476 (1988) (describing the tra-
ditional view).
39. California Trout, 255 Cal. Rptr. at 211.
40. Id. at 212 (quoting People v. Kerber, 93 P 878, 879 (Cal. 1908)).
41. 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983).
42. Id. at 1089 (quoting Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 452 (1892)).
43. Id. at 1095.
44. Id. at 1094, 1096.
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mitted use exists in such property
In another Idaho case, Selkirk-Priest Basin Association. v Andrus, the
court held that the public trust doctnne conferred standing to an environ-
mental group to challenge a timber sale on state forest lands, on the
grounds that the sedimentation created by the logging would harm a creek
bed and its fish spawning grounds.45 This was significant because the
court denied standing to the same group based on their asserted status of
state school trust land beneficianes.' Moreover, there was apparently no
statute upon which the plaintiffs could have relied.
In a remarkable case from Wisconsin, that state's supreme court held
that the public trust doctrine allows the state to protect lakeside ecolo-
gy " In Vander Bloemen v Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources,
the state prevailed over a lakeside owner who challenged past, concededly
illegal acts of the state Department of Natural Resources in raising the
lake's water level. The court acknowledged that the raised water level had
harmed the owners' property Nonetheless, because the lakeside ecosystem
had matured around the new, higher water level, the court held that the
state, as fiduciary, properly protected the lakeside environment by main-
taining the raised water level.48
More recently, in Aspen Wilderness Workshop v Colorado Water
Conservation Board, the Colorado Supreme Court held that the state's
trust duty required the Water Conservation Board to appropriate instream
water flows sufficient to preserve the natural environment of Snowmass
Creek. Moreover, the state could not allow any needed water to be appro-
priated by a ski resort for snow-making purposes.49
These are but a select few of the hundreds of state cases developing
and applying the public trust doctrine to protect ecologically sensitive
water-related resources. Unfortunately, the doctrine has not fared as well
in the federal courts.
IV THE CHECKERED PAST OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN
FEDERAL COURTS NEED NOT PORTEND THE FUTURE
Although state courts have developed a formidable body of public
trust doctrine common law, the federal courts have not. In only a handful
of published cases have federal courts been willing to find a public trust
45. 899 P.2d 949, 953-55 (Idaho 1995).
46. Id. at 952 (finding only schools or school districts had standing to challenge the administra-
tion of school endowment trust lands).
47. See Vander Bloemen v. Wisconsin Dep't of Natural Resources, No. 95-1761, 1996 WL
346266 (Wis. App. June 26, 1996).
48. Id. at *2 ("Past illegalities do not matter if the [altered] lake level is within the current
public interest.").
49. 901 P.2d 1251, 1257 (Colo. 1995) (en banc).
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duty on the part of a federal agency or official. Courts generally give one
of two reasons for their unwillingness to find such a duty Some have
cited preemption as the reason, finding that the area of law had been
wholly occupied by the numerous federal environmental and natural re-
source preservation and management statutes. 0 Others view the doctrine
as being more appropriate for state court consideration, or are otherwise
reluctant to develop federal common law "' It is likely that these deci-
sions have chilled plaintiffs who might otherwise bring such a claim in
federal court. Whether that is the reason or not, the doctrine has lan-
guished m that venue.
The reluctance on the part of the federal courts to embrace the public
trust doctrine is not warranted. There are many areas which have not been
wholly occupied by federal statutes to the extent that the doctrine is pre-
empted. In water rights battles, for example, no existing statute addresses
the harm which may result from over-appropriation. In challenges to the
development of waterfront property, no statute will necessarily give the
agency the clout it needs to refuse a permit which impedes the public's
access or beneficial use of the waters.
Furthermore, the finding of a duty on the part of a federal agency is
entirely appropriate and a proper complement to existing state law where
the threatened harm is not addressed by a state resource protection statute.
In cases where state agencies are not involved, and where a harm will
result unless a federal agency steps in, no interference with the state's
interests will result; thus, no abstention is warranted. The citizens of the
various states are all U.S. citizens as well, and the federal government
owes them a duty to step in where all other legal devices have failed to
protect their federal trust resources. The federal courts have a duty to
ensure that this federal trust is properly fulfilled.
There are two ways a federal court may apply the public trust doc-
trine. First, in a diversity suit, the court may apply the appropriate state's
common law This is not problematic, and should raise no objections. In
contrast, the second way a federal court may apply the public trust doc-
trine-by fashioning federal common law-would raise objections on a
variety of grounds.
A. Application of State Public Trust Law by Federal Courts in Diversity
Cases
Application of the public trust doctrine by federal courts sitting by
diversity would not generally be problematic. The court simply applies the
50. See infra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
51. See infra note 126 and accompanying text.
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state's version of the public trust doctrine.52 The duty of the federal
courts to apply state law is so well settled, no viable objections could be
raised other than a challenge to the court's choice among state law Of the
federal courts which have heard public trust doctrine claims, most have
been cases of this nature. 3
One such case was Bunch v Hodel,"4 where the United States was
called upon to defend its actions pursuant to a state lease. The lease al-
lowed the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service to draw down the water level of
a wildlife refuge lake to improve the lake's ability to support aquatic
wildlife. The court was not called upon to apply a federal trust doctrine,
but rather held that the state did not violate the state's public trust duties
in allowing the draw-down. In fact, the court found that the draw-down
properly protected public trust interests.5
Even in states without a fully developed public trust doctrine, a feder-
al court may still apply state law by predicting how the highest state court
would decide the issue. 6 Cases requiring the court to apply state law are
the easy calls, requiring only that the facts of the case raise a public trust
issue under state law Not as easy is the application of a public trust doc-
trine resting entirely upon federal law
B. Application of the Public Trust Doctrine Through the Development of
Federal Common Law
There are compelling reasons for the development of a federal public
trust common law in cases raising a federal question. Where, under federal
statutory law, federal agencies are (or feel) powerless to withhold approval
of harmful resource use or extraction practices, the doctrine could give the
agency the authority it needs to forbid or limit the proposed use (or the
authority the court needs to uphold the plaintiff's demand that the federal
agency do so). However, the fashioning of federal common law often
meets with opposition, and there are other principles of federal jurisdiction
52. See Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
53. See, e.g., Maryland Dep't of Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess, 350 F Supp. 1060, 1065-
67 (D. Md. 1972) (holding that state, as trustee, may sue for injury to state waters caused by oil spill);
Capano v. Borough of Stone Harbor, 530 F Supp. 1254 (D.N.J. 1982) (holding Borough violated state
public trust doctrine by allowing nuns to swim at beach when other members of public were not al-
lowed to swim). But see Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotrone, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (Ist Cir. 1980) (re-
versing similar holding and declining to decide case on public trust doctrine grounds where recovery
on statutory grounds was possible).
54. 793 F.2d 129 (6th Cir. 1986).
55. Id. at 133-34.
56. See Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y, 819 F.2d 875, 879 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. de-
nied 484 U.S. 926 (1987) ("Federal courts are not precluded from affording relief simply because
neither the State Supreme Court nor the state legislature has enunciated a clear rule governing a par-
ticular type of controversy.").
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which plaintiffs and the courts must confront.
Application of the public trust doctrine through federal common law
would require the court to engage in a two-part process. First, the court
must find a trust responsibility on the part of a federal agency or official.
Second, the court must flesh out that responsibility with common law
rules and standards.
The first step has met with reluctance on the part of the courts. Al-
though some federal judges have been willing to find that a federal agency
has a trust duty, the courts have generally done so only where a relevant
federal statutory scheme implies or expressly states a trust duty "7 There-
fore, plaintiffs seeking to assert public trust claims would be wise to find
statutory grounds to truss up their argument for a federal trust, especially
if the statute expresses or implies a trust-like duty
Furthermore, if a public trust claim is wedded to a federal statutory
claim, the court should not have to entertain objections to its federal ques-
tion jurisdiction." Unfortunately, the finding of a duty may be problem-
atic where a duty-invoking statute does not apply to a particular case. In
those instances, plaintiffs must argue that there is ample basis for the
finding of an independent federal common law trust duty
Charles Wilkinson posits that the Illinois Central Court relied not
upon state (specifically, Illinois) law in formulating its opinion, but upon
federal law 59 Wilkinson concludes that the "Court made it clear that the
57. See Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, 424 F. Supp. 172, 172-73 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (finding
that the National Park Organic Act imposed common law trust responsibilities, analogous to state
responsibilities under the public trust doctrine, on the Secretary of the Interior); Sierra Club v. Andrus,
487 F. Supp. 443, 449 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that trust responsibilities are statutory, not common-law
based). But see Wilkinson, supra note 16, at 292-93 (criticizing the reasoning of the Sierra Club v.
Andrus court).
58. Without a statutory claim, there could be an intense battle over federal question jurisdiction.
For example, in Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 372 (1977), the Court over-
ruled prior cases which held that federal law controlled issues of ownership of navigable waters. The
Court held that once vested in a state at the time of its admission to the Union, riverbed land is not
subject to later defeasance by operation of federal common law, in this case the common law of accre-
tion. Id. at 372. Thus, absent some other federal question, a claim of state ownership of formerly fed-
eral land would not "arise under" the laws of the United States. Corvallis Sand & Gravel, however, is
limited to its specific holding, where the Court found it had been error to treat "the equal-footing
doctrine as a source of federal common law after that doctrine had vested title to the riverbed in the
State " Id. at 381. Corvallis has no application in a controversy over the use of waters or
waterbodies located on federal land, where a wholly federal public trust common law question is
raised. Moreover, public trust cases involve many more issues than did Corvallis, which focused mere-
ly on the amount of land the United States owns. Nonetheless, by tying the federal trust claim to a
federal statute, federal question jurisdiction is ensured.
59. Charles F. Wilkinson, The Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some of the Traditional Doc-
trine, 19 ENvTL. L. 425, 453-54 (1989) (pointing to the Illinois Central Court's use of language of
general applicability, such as "a state" throughout the opinion, and to the lack of citation to any-state
law).
62 PUBLIC LAND & RESOURCES LAW REVIEW
trust derives from federal law and is binding on all states 1160
Wilkinson discusses two possible federal sources of the doctrine. First, the
trust may be viewed as deriving from the various statehood acts, which
impliedly conditioned statehood upon the states' promise to keep their
watercourses "forever free. ' ' 61 Second, Wilkinson argues, the trust may be
viewed as deriving from the Constitution, as a parallel to the federal navi-
gation servitude, with both resting upon the Commerce Clause; the trust
then passed from the United States to the states as an implied servitude.62
Although not argued by Wilkinson, others have cited the Property Clause
as an additional basis from which a federal trust duty may be said to de-
rive.63 In United States v Ruby Company, the Ninth Circuit adopted the
concept that the public trust doctrine is based in the Property Clause.'
In Kleppe v New Mexico, where ranchers challenged the Bureau of
Land Management's (BLM) authority to protect free-roaming horses and
burros, the Supreme Court confirmed the BLM's power, stating:
[W]hile the furthest reaches of the power granted by the Property Clause
have not been definitively resolved, we have repeatedly observed that
'the power over the public lands thus entrusted to Congress is without
limitations' We have noted, for example, that the Property Clause
gives Congress the power to protect [the public lands] from trespass
and injury, and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain
rights in them.65
Thus, there are arguably three separate federal sources for a federal public
trust doctrine.
In his article, Wilkinson addresses the argument that the public trust
doctrine has its basis in state law, citing language from both old and new
cases cited to support that argument.' Nonetheless, Wilkinson concludes
that the trust should apply to both the states and the federal government,
as both have powerful interests in highly valued natural resources which
should be impressed with the trust.67
If Wilkinson is correct that there is solid federal grounding for the
doctrine, no legal impediment exists to the application of the public trust
60. Id. at 454.
61. Id. at 456-58.
62. Id. at 458-59.
63. The Property Clause states that "Congress shall have the Power to Dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting Property belonging to the United States." U.S. CONsT.
art. IV, § 3, cl.2.
64. 588 F.2d 697, 704 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 917 (1979). Unfortunately, this
concept has not been further developed by the courts.
65. Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
66. Wilkinson, supra note 59, at 459-60.
67. Id. at 460-61.
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doctrine by federal courts, for a federal question is surely implicated when
a federal agency or official is charged with a trust duty Nonetheless,
federal courts, displaying a reluctance for defining the trust concept with
federal common law, have not generally entertained claims for a federal
public trust doctrine.
The second step in applying the public trust doctrine via federal com-
mon law requires the court to fashion that common law, either "whole
cloth, ' ' s or by "borrowing" state law 69 In the first instance, the same
law would apply regardless of the state in which the federal court sat.7"
In the second instance, the federal common law would vary, depending on
each state's articulation of the doctrine. Because the existence and scope
of a duty of a federal agency or official would be at issue, based on the
interests of the United States in its national trust resources, the latter meth-
od should be utilized. The Supreme Court has cautioned that federal com-
mon law should be developed in those areas:
concerned with the rights and obligations of the United States [and in
cases involving] interstate disputes implicating the conflicting rights
of States In these instances, our federal system does not permit the
controversy to be resolved under state law, either because the authority
and duties of the United States as sovereign are intimately involved or
because the interstate nature of the controversy makes it inappropri-
ate for state law to control.7'
Moreover, development of federal public trust common law, where valu-
able federal lands are threatened, fits the criteria set forth by the Court in
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc..
[Flederal programs that 'by their nature are and must be uniform in
character throughout the nation' necessitate formulation of controlling
federal rules. Apart from considerations of uniformity, we must also
determine whether application of state law would frustrate specific objec-
68. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common Law, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV., 383, 410 (1964). The fashioning of federal common law whole cloth is thought to be
constitutionally prohibited "where both the Constitution and Congress are silent." PETER W. Low &
JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS 304 (3d ed.
1994). However, because the roots of the public trust doctrine are believed to reach back to the consti-
tution, or to the State Enabling Acts, then the prohibition would not apply. See supra notes 59-66 and
accompanying text (discussing Wilkinson's theory that the roots of the doctrine reach back to either
the Commerce Clause or the Enabling Acts, and. also discussing the Ninth Circuit's Property Clause
theory).
69. See, e.g., DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (applying state definition of
"children" to a Federal Copyright Act question).
70. See Low & JEFFRIES, supra note 68, at 320.
71. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).
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tives of the federal programs. If so, we must fashion special rules solici-
tous of those federal interests.72
Based upon these standards, a federal court could fashion federal common
law for a federal public trust doctrne. In fact, because of the valuable
federal interests at stake in many public resource cases, the fashioning of
federal common law would seem to be required.
C. The New World Mine Controversy as a Model for the Application of
a Federal Common Law Trust Doctrine
As a model for the application of the public trust doctrine by a feder-
al court through the development of federal common law, consider the
still-boiling controversy surrounding the proposed New World Mine in
Montana. The Canadian-owned Crown Butte Mining Company (Company)
planned to develop a huge heap-leach gold mine73 upon lands it privately
owned in southern Montana. Those private lands are completely surround-
ed by federal lands-the Absaroka-Beartooth Wilderness Area to the
north, the Gallatin National Forest to the west, the Custer and Shoshone
National Forests to the east and southeast, and most importantly, Yellow-
stone National Park just a few miles to the south.74 The Company held
patented mining claims under the General Mining Law of 1872."5 When
the Company proposed to impound vast amounts of heavy-metal laden,
sulfuric acid producing mine wastes, or tailings, in the Fisher Creek Val-
ley, re-routing the stream in the process, the mine became a cause celebre
of local and national environmental groups.76
All waters which stood to be fouled by the mining operation flowed
into pristine "waters of the United States," as that term is defined by the
Federal Clean Water Act (CWA),77 and all waters flowed eventually
72. United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979) (citations omitted).
73. A heap-leach gold mine requires the extraction, crushing and processing of vast amounts of
ore. The crushed ore is bathed with a chemical, often arsenic, which "leaches" the gold from the ore.
This process makes mining profitable in situations where non-chemical mining would not be worth the
effort, depending upon the price of gold, of course. See Michael Satchell, A New Battle Over Yellow-
stone Park: A Natural Wonder A Mine and an 1872 Law, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Mar. 13, 1995,
at 36.
74. Satchell, supra note 73, at 34, 36.
75. Now codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-54 (1994). This of course means that the Company holds
title to the surface, as well as to the mineral rights below. See CHARLES F WILKINSON, CROSSING THE
NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER AND THE FUTURE OF THE WEST 48 (1992) (explaining patent process
and the rights conveyed by patent).
76. When metal-bearing ore is exposed to air or water, the metals react with the oxygen to
form sulfuric acid, which then flows into the nearby streams. When the concentrations are great
enough, the acid-laced water kills all living organisms in its path. See Satchell, supra note 73, at 36,
41.
77. Under the Clean Water Act (CWA), "waters of the United States" is defined broadly and
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through Yellowstone Park. ESA listed Grizzlies inhabit the area, as well as
many non-listed but rare species. One of the threatened streams is con-
gressionally designated as Wild and Scenic."
The State of Montana was called upon to issue a permit to allow the
discharge of heavy metals, sulfuric acid, and other pollutants into those
waters which are under the jurisdiction of Montana's Department of Envi-
ronmental Quality (DEQ), which administers the CWA in Montana.79
However, the environmental groups soon discovered that the Montana
Legislature had bent over backwards to allow the New World and other
mines to be developed in Montana, by passing a law allowing DEQ to
permit "temporary" water pollution." DEQ's involvement would have
allowed the plaintiffs to bring a state public trust claim against DEQ, had
DEQ ultimately granted a CWA permit. Under the court's duty to apply
state law, the federal court would apply Montana's public trust law in
deciding whether DEQ had violated its duty by granting the permit. Hav-
ing federal question jurisdiction over the case, the court's supplemental
and pendant party jurisdiction would extend to the DEQ claim." Further-
more, if the plaintiffs had desired to do so, they could have claimed that
Montana's state legislature had violated its state trust duties in passing the
temporary water quality laws.
But this case provided the plaintiffs with an opportunity to bring a
federal public trust claim. The operation of the huge mine depended upon
surface use of National Forest lands; thus, the Forest Service was called
upon to approve or disapprove of the company's mining plan. 2 Further-
more, the Forest Service felt powerless to disapprove the mine plan, citing
its limited authority to regulate mining:" "If the plan is in compliance
includes almost all waters. See Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, Inc. 904 F Supp. 1168 (D.
Mont. 1995). Someone wishing to legally discharge pollutants into "waters of the United States" must
first obtain a permit from the United States. Id. at 1173 (citing 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 i(a) & 1342 (1994) of
the CWA).
78. See Satchell, supra note 73, at 36.
79. See Beartooth Alliance, 904 F. Supp. at 1173.
80. See Mont. Code Ann. § 75-5-401 (1996).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) authorizes the courts to hear claims that are part of the same case or
controversy as a claim within the court's original jurisdiction. The statute also grants jurisdiction over
claims that involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties, thereby authorizing what is called
pendant party jurisdiction. This statute enables litigants to take advantage of the federal forum and
avoid multiple litigation. Joan Steinman, Supplemental Jurisdiction in § 1441 Removed Cases: An Un-
surveyed Frontier of Congress' Handiwork, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 305, 306-07 (1993). This would be
advantageous for a plaintiff who wishes to charge both state and federal agencies with a violation of
their respective trust duties, in a case such as the one involving the New World Mine, where a state
and the federal government are involved in approving a project.
82. See Califormia Coastal Comm'n v. Granite Rock Co, 480 U.S. 572, 582 (1987) (describing
Forest Service's role in regulating surface use of a mining operation on National Forest land).
83. The attitude of the Forest Service is not surprising. The Surface Resources and Multiple
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with [other federal environmental laws], the Forest Service would have no
statutory or regulatory authority to deny the plan." 4 It looked as though
the plans for the mine would proceed, despite the enormous threat that it
posed to the unique, valuable resources of Montana and the United States,
and despite the panoply of federal statutes. This case powerfully demon-
strates the need for a federal public trust doctrine.
Although most of us know that the story ends with a negotiated ex-
change of yet-to-be approved substitute federal land, 5 let us imagine a
different ending. Let us imagine that the land exchange, which came like a
deus ex machina to prevent this blight upon the land, had not been pro-
posed, let alone negotiated. Imagine instead, that the environmental groups
sued, as they actually did,86 based on violations of the CWA. But imag-
ine that they also asserted a claim that the Forest Service had violated its
National Forest Management Ace' (NFMA) duties, and had violated its
NEPA duties as well. And finally, imagine a claim based on the federal
common law public trust doctrine.
Could a judge for the Federal District of Montana who heard the
statutory claims also entertain the public trust claim? Could she rule that
the Forest Service, as trustee for the United States, should not have ap-
proved the mine plan? Could the judge rule that the DEQ, based on its
state trust duty, should not have permitted the discharge of pollutants into
waters of the United States?
Based on the CWA, NEPA and NFMA claims, the court clearly
would have federal question jurisdiction over the claims relating to the
Use Act, 30 U.S.C. § 612(b), has been interpreted as "a recognition that mining operations 'may not
be prohibited nor so unreasonably circumscribed as to amount to a prohibition."' United States v.
Doremus, 888 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Weiss, 642 F.2d 296, 299 (9th
Cir. 1981)). Although a claim could be made that the word "unreasonably" allows the Forest Service a
certain amount of discretion in regulating mining, the Forest Service has rarely tested the issue. See
WILKINSON, supra note 75, at 57-58, 66-67 (describing the perception of powerlessness on the part of
the Forest Service and BLM to sufficiently regulate mining activities on federal lands, despite what
Wilkinson views as some authority to do so); see also Granite Rock, 480 U.S. at 598-99 (Powell, J.
concurmng in part, dissenting in part) (citing Forest Service handbook and manual for the proposiuon
that the Forest Service must balance the policy of promoting mineral development with its responsi-
bility to reasonably protect the environment). It is precisely in such situauons that the additional au-
thority of the public trust doctnne is needed.
84. See GALLATIN NAT'L FOREST AND SHOSHONE NAT'L FOREST, U.S. FOREST SERVICE, U.S.
DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, AND MONTANA DEP'T OF STATE LANDS, PRELIMINARY DRAFT ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT, CROWN BUTTE MINES, INC., NEW WORLD PROJECT, 20
(1995).
85. See Brian Kuehl, Deal Protects Yellowstone, Cleans Up Site and Ensures Public Participa-
tion, GREATER YELLOWSTONE REPORT, Summer 1996, at 6.
86. See Beartooth Alliance v. Crown Butte Mines, Inc. 904 F Supp. 1168 (D. Mont. 1995).
Plaintiffs have agreed to drop the suit when the land exchange is completed. Kuehl, supra note 85, at
6.
87. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614 (1994).
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actions of the Forest Service. Thus, the first challenge for the court would
be finding a federal public trust duty on the part of the Forest Service. Yet
here is presented a perfect opportunity for the court to find such a duty,
based on the unique role the Forest Service plays in this controversy, as
an agent for the United States. For here, the waters which the tailings
impoundment would threaten flow across state borders, from Montana into
Wyoming. And all potentially befouled waters flow through federal lands,
into a unique federal enclave. Thus, the court could find that the United
States re-acquired its trust duty, once abdicated to the states, when it re-
served the lands that comprise the national forests and the national parks.
Fashioning federal common law is especially proper in this case, where
interstate waters are effected, and where the rights and duties of the Unit-
ed States are at issue."8
Two federal courts have held that the federal government retained its
common law trust duty even after the lands in question passed to the state
upon statehood. In United States v 1.58 Acres of Land, the court held that
the United States and the states are co-trustees of public trust lands, where
trust land was subsequently conveyed from the state to the United States
through condemnation." Similarly, in City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards
Corp.," the court held that the United States "may not abdicate the role
of trustee for the public land when it acquires land by condemnation."'
There is no reason why condemnation should delimit the reasoning of
1.58 Acres of Land and City of Alameda. Ownership is ownership, regard-
less of the means of obtaining it. Thus, the rule that the United States may
not abdicate its trust duties over its water-related resources should apply
with even greater force when the United States retains ownership of public
land through reservation. In our imaginary case, the United States' re-
served forest lands and the very first National Park.
In United States v Burlington Northern Railroad Co.,' the court
declined to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant, where the
United States sought to recover for damages caused by a fire at the Har-
vard Waterfowl Production Area. Relying upon cases such as 1.58 Acres,
the court acknowledged that "the public trust doctrine has traditionally
been asserted by the States," but noted that "the doctrine has also been
applied to the Federal Government."'93 To support its conclusion, the
88. See supra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
89. 523 F. Supp. 120 (D. Mass. 1981)
90. 632 F. Supp. 333 (N.D. Cal. 1986), affd on reconsideration, 635 F Supp. 1447 (N.D. Cal.
1986).
91. Todd Shipyards, 635 F Supp. at 1450 (quoting 1.58 Acres, 523 F Supp. at 122).
92. 710 F Supp. 1286 (D. Neb. 1989).
93. Id. at 1287.
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court noted the long line of Supreme Court cases articulating the trust
duties of the United States towards the public lands.94 Finding that the
federal government may thus function as the states do, in a parens patriae
capacity, the court found that the United States could maintain an action
to recover damages for loss of trust resources.9"
As the courts held in the above cases, the state and the United States
are co-trustees, and "neither government has the power to destroy the
trust."96 The court could adopt this holding in our imaginary case and
create a federal common law trust duty for the Forest Service. As one
author so passionately stated, in response to the New World Mine contro-
versy"
We have heard the prevailing assumption under the 1872 Mining Law
that permits might have to be issued because of vested mining nghts.
Whether that assumption is true I will leave to people who know
more about that law than I do. That does not necessarily mean, however,
that the company may appropriate public waters and convert them to a
waste disposal pond. They may own the mining rights, but they do not
own the water of the United States.97
As trustee for the waters and the related resources, the Forest Service has
a duty to protect those resources from threatened, harmful appropriation
and pollution in our imaginary case.
But let us assume that our court is reticent to find a duty based upon
the as yet under-developed, common law co-trustee concept. In the alter-
native, the court could find a trust duty somewhere in the penumbra of
NFMA. The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly articulated the duty of the Forest
Service to "provide for diversity of plant and animal communities," ex-
plaining that this duty also entails "ensur[ing] viable, or self-sustaining
populations" and "applies with special force to 'sensitive' species."" In
our imaginary case, numerous species, some listed, depend on the pristine
nature of the potentially affected lands to survive. Clean water is a crucial
part of this life-support system. As in Sierra Club v Department of Interi-
or, where the court found that the National Park System Act imposed trust
responsibilities on the Park Service beyond its "general fiduciary obliga-
tions, our imaginary court could hold the Forest Service accountable as
94. Id. (citing United States v. Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888) and Light v. United States, 220 U.S.
523 (1911), among others).
95. Id.
96. See 1.58 Acres, 523 F Supp. at 125.
97. Robert W Adler, Symposium: National Parks Workshop; Water Quality Protection, 15 J.
ENERGY, NAT. RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 311, 316 (1995).
98. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest Serv., 88 F.3d 754, 759 (9th
Cir. 1996) (citing Oregon Natural Resources Council v. Lowe, 836 F Supp. 727, 733 (D. Or. 1993)).
99. 376 F Supp 90, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1974) (finding that the Park Service violated its duty by
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fiduciaries, finding support from the Forest Service's statutory duties un-
der NFMA.
The court could find a trust duty under NEPA even more easily, for
NEPA contains express trust language. NEPA's goals include Congress'
desire that federal agencies "fulfill the responsibilities of each generation
as trustee[s] of the environment for succeeding generations."'" Although
NEPA has been greatly emasculated by the courts when used alone to halt
ecologically harmful activities, 0' in a case such as our imaginary case,
with egregious facts and traditional trust resources at risk, the court could
build upon NEPA's trust language to construct a public trust duty for the
Forest Service, similar to what the court did in Sierra Club v. Dept. of
Interior
In Massachusetts v Andrus,"° the state challenged federally permit-
ted off-shore oil drilling under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. The
First Circuit Court characterized the Secretary of the Interior as the
"guardian" of the public domain, whose "legal duty embraces a solemn
responsibility to see that the great life systems of the ocean are not unrea-
sonably jeopardized by activities undertaken to extract oil and gas from
the seabed."'0 3 This reasoning should apply with equal force m our
imaginary case, relying on NEPA-imposed trust duties, to the great life
system of the Greater Yellowstone Ecosystem.
Having found a duty, our court need only now define the scope of
that duty The court could find that, to fulfill its trust duty, the Forest
Service should have declined to approve the Company's mining plan, but
instead should have conditioned its approval upon compliance with sub-
stantial environmental safeguards. Undoubtedly, such compliance would
render the operation of the mine less profitable than previously contem-
plated, indeed it may render it economically unfeasible. Nonetheless, the
court may uphold this regulation.
Though it rarely does so, when the Forest Service has imposed such
conditions, the conditions have survived judicial review. One example may
be found in Clouser v. Espey, where the Ninth Circuit upheld extensive
conditions upon miners' access to their claims on National Forest land,
despite the miners' assertion of a vested right to mine, and despite the
allowing harmful timber practices on private land bordering Redwood National Park).
100. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b)(1) (1994).
101. See supra note 7.
102. 594 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1979).
103. Id. at 892. Similarly, in Sierra Club v. Dep't of Interior, the court found that the Secretary
is "guardian of the people of [the] United States over the public lands." 376 F. Supp. at 93 (quoting
Light v. United Land Ass'n., 142 U.S. 161, 181 (1891) and Utah Power & Light v. United States, 243
U.S. 389, 409 (1916), for a finding that the Secretary has an "obligation to see that none of the
public domain is wasted").
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recognition that such regulation would "affect claim validity "'4 As the
Forest Service did in Clouser v Espy, in our case the Forest Service could
ban all motorized means of operation and transportation." 5 Additionally,
the Forest Service, given its enhanced authority under the public trust doc-
trine, could refuse approval of the re-routing of Fisher Creek under any
circumstances, as such re-routing would certainly upset the balance of the
established streamside ecosystem. The Forest Service could also limit the
amount of water the Company could use in its operations, where that
water is otherwise needed to ensure riparian health in the surrounding
streams and rivers. Finally, because of the frequency with which plastic
liners leak in heap-leach operations,"° the Forest Service could refuse to
allow dependance on plastic liners alone to protect groundwater.
Because compliance with such conditions would significantly de-
crease the economic viability of the proposed mine, the Company may
argue that the Forest Service has so "unreasonably circumscribed" the
mining operation "as to amount to a prohibition," in violation of the
law "07 Nonetheless, our court may uphold these regulations, building up-
on cases such as Clouser, and adding public trust concepts from cases
such as Massachusetts v Andrus. With the additional authority granted by
the trust relationship, our court has solid footing for its affirmance of the
Forest Service regulations. There remain, however, other important issues
which the Company would surely raise.
1. Has the Public Trust Doctrine been Preempted?
Undoubtedly, the Company would argue that a federal public trust
doctrine has no place in this controversy because the problems of pollution
and resource management have been preempted by federal statutes. The
Company may argue that such a finding constrained a federal court in
Conservation Law Foundation of New England v Clark.'8 In that case
plaintiffs claimed a public trust duty on the part of the Secretary of the
Interior to stop off-road vehicle use on National Seashore lands. The court
recognized the duty of the Secretary to see that "none of the public do-
main is wasted," but nonetheless found, in view of congressional and
executive mandates concerning the protection of the Seashore, that further
consideration of the public trust doctrine was not necessary "
104. 42 F.3d 1522, 1529-30 (1994) (citing United States v. Richardson, 599 F.2d 290 (9th Cir.
1979) (where "unreasonable destruction of surface resources" was found enjoinable).
105. The Clouser court upheld the Forest Service decision as to both wilderness and non-wilder-
ness forest lands. See Clouser, 42 F.3d at 1530.
106. See, e.g., Barry Norean, Open-Pit Mine Clears Final Hurdle on Arduous Path to Approval,
COLO. SPRINGS GAZE1TE TELEGRAPH, Sept. 23, 1993, at B1.
107. See supra note 83.
108. 590 F Supp. 1467 (D. Mass 1984).
109. Id. at 1480 n.8; see also District of Columbia v. Air Florida, 750 F.2d 1077 (D.C. Cir.
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Our plaintiffs may counter this preemption defense by reference to
the rules developed by the Supreme Court. As explained by the Court, the
question of statutory preemption of federal common law "involves an
assessment of the scope of the legislation and whether the scheme estab-
lished by Congress addresses the problem formerly governed by federal
common law "'"' To preempt, the legislative scheme must speak directly
to a question; "when Congress has not spoken to a particular issue," feder-
al common law applies."'
Applying these concepts to the New World Mine controversy, it is
clear that the question of a federal trust duty is not directly addressed by
any statutory scheme. To be sure, there are schemes to prevent pollution,
to regulate the use of the surface lands disturbed by mining, and to bal-
ance the competing uses of the land. However, no statute addresses the
problems raised by our imaginary case, where water flows from one state
into another, over federal property managed by two different federal agen-
cies, governed by two vastly different statutory schemes. Each agency is
constrained by their limited jurisdiction, and the statutes do not clearly
speak to the duty of the agencies to protect the federal resources at issue.
The issue is not preempted.
The Supreme Court has recognized the need and authority of courts
to fashion federal common law in a "few and restricted" instances."2
One such instance is where a federal rule of decision is "necessary to
protect uniquely federal interests."'  A unique federal interest exists
where the dispute involves "the rights and obligations of the United
States" or "implicat[es] the conflicting rights of states.""' Obviously,
both of these situations are presented by our imaginary case: the waters
flow over state boundaries, and the question of a federal public trust duty
directly involves the rights and obligations of the United States. Thus, be-
cause the question of a federal public trust duty is not addressed by any
statute and because the development of federal common law is proper in
this case, preemption will not operate to deprive the court of jurisdiction.
1984) (declining to decide whether public trust doctrine applies to the federal government, or to D.C.'s
attempt to recover for injuries to Potomac River caused by crashed jet, given the "paucity" of prece-
dent and the fact that the issues were not fully developed in lower court. The Court indicated that
propriety of applying public trust doctrine to federal waters is a complex issue, requiring the creation
of new federal common law in the face of what may be preemption in all areas the public trust doc-
trine occupies). $
110. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 315 n.8 (1981).
111. Id. at 313, 315.
112. Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Material, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1980).
113. Banco Nactonal de Cuba v. Sabatne, 376 U.S. 398, 426 (1964).
114. Texas Industries, 451 U.S. at 641.
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2. Do Plaintiffs Have Standing to Enforce the Federal Public Trust
Doctrine?
Certainly the Company would assert that our imaginary plaintiffs do
not have standing to sue, arguing that they are merely among a huge,
undefined, unmanageable class of citizens, possessing no special right to
enforce the public trust. This argument has prevailed for defendants in two
jurisdictions. In Louisiana, the courts have found that while each member
of the public has an interest in public trust resources, "no one citizen or
citizen group has a 'special interest' beyond that enjoyed by the general
public."' 5 To establish standing in Louisiana, the plaintiff must show
that his "livelihood, health, welfare, or personal interests will be di-
rectly affected by the failure" of the trustee agency 116
In Wisconsin, the public trust doctrine has been held to "merely
establish[ ] standing for the state, or any person suing in the name of the
state.""' 7 Instead, it is the duty of the Wisconsin Department of Natural
Resources to "represent the public in guarding [the] state's resources.""' '
The irony of this rule is reflected in the cases where it is precisely that
agency which was charged with violating the trust." 9
Fortunately, not all states have viewed standing under the public trust
doctrine so narrowly The Illinois Supreme Court has stated:
If the "public trust" doctrine is to have any meaning or vitality at all, the
members of the public, at least taxpayers who are the beneficiaries of
that trust, must have the right and standing to enforce it. To tell them
that they must wait upon governmental action [to enforce the trust] is
often an ineffectual denial of the right for all time. The conclusion we
have reached is in accord with decisions in other jurisdictions. 2 '
States, of course, are free to develop their own standing requirements;
however, federal courts must follow the federally articulated rules of
standing. 2' Thus, the approach our court might take will likely fall
somewhere in between the approaches of the state courts quoted above.
Our court may hold that, as long as our plaintiffs have standing under the
standards articulated by the Supreme Court in Lujan v Defenders of Wild-
115. Mouton v. Dept. of Wildlife & Fisheries, 657 So. 2d 622, 627 (La. App. 1995).
116. Id. at 627-28.
117. State Public Intervenor v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 339 N.W.2d 324, 328 (Wis. 1983).
118. Id. at 329.
119. See, e.g., id.
120. Paepcke v. Public Building Comm'n of Chicago, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (1970) (citing two
Massachusetts cases).
121. See Susan N. Herman, Beyond Parity: Section 1983 and the State Courts, 54 BROOK. L.
REV 1057, 1117 (1989).
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life,' they may enforce the public trust doctrine without showing such
specific harm as that required by Louisiana courts. Lujan is one of the
Court's most recent cases involving the Article III standing" of envi-
ronmental plaintiffs. Under Lujan, to obtain standing, a litigant must show-
1) that she has suffered a concrete, particularized, actual or imminent in-
vasion of a legally-protected interest; 2) the injury is caused by the con-
duct of the defendant; and 3) it is likely that the injury will be redressed
by a favorable decision.1
24
Our plaintiffs can satisfy these standing requirements. As residents
living near the proposed mine or downstream or downgrade from the site,
they suffer imminent injury when the waters are allowed to be polluted. In
addition, as environmentalists who have an interest in hiking, studying,
and observing the area in its natural state, they have a particularized, le-
gally-protected interest in preserving the natural resources. By allowing the
mine to go forward, the Forest Service has caused this imminent injury,
and a favorable ruling would certainly redress the injuries. Thus, the court
would be well within its discretion in holding that our plaintiffs have
standing.
3. Do Principles of Abstention Have a Role in Federal Public Trust
Cases?
In a further defensive tactic, the Company may ask the court to ab-
stain, arguing that it is solely within the purview of state courts to hear
public trust claims. Such an argument prevailed in United States v Re-
serve Mining Co., a water pollution case where the court declined to hear
a public trust claim, finding that such a claim was best left to the state
courts to develop."' However, our imaginary court should not follow the
Reserve Mining court's poor example. As the Supreme Court has stated:
Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not
the rule. It is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a
district court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdica-
tion can be justified only in the exceptional circumstances where
the order to the parties to repair to state court would clearly serve an
important countervailing interest."'
122. 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
123. Article III of the U.S. Constitution requires the presentation to the court of a live "case or
controversy" before a litigant may properly invoke the court's jurisdiction. See Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737 (1984).
124. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560.
125. 394 F Supp. 233 (D. Minn. 1974).
126. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976) (quot-
ing County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959)).
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Of the three narrow exceptions developed by the Court, where abstention
is thought to be appropriate, none would be presented by the usual public
trust case.
The first exception, called Pullman abstention, arises "in cases pre-
senting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented
in a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state
law "'27 Such issues are not presented in most public trust cases, and are
certainly not presented in our imaginary case. The constitutional underpin-
ning of a federal public trust doctrine would not be mooted nor presented
in a different posture in state court, as state law should not control the
duties of federal agencies regarding federal trust property
Likewise, the second exception will not result in abstention in our
case. Called Burford abstention, this exception arises where "difficult
questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial import
whose importance transcends the result in the case then at bar." '28 Under
this exception, it is enough that federal review would be "disruptive of
state efforts to establish a coherent policy "'29 In cases where a federal
court is asked to apply state public trust law, Burford abstention may be
appropriate. 3 ' However, this exception does not apply to the determina-
tion of a federal public trust doctrine, which, in cases such as ours, should
be controlled by federal policy and law
Finally, the third exception, called Younger abstention, has no rele-
vance to public trust cases, as it arises only where federal jurisdiction has
been invoked for the purpose of restraining state criminal proceedings. 3 '
None of the narrow categories of abstention is presented in our imaginary
case, thus the court clearly has jurisdiction.
4. Do Regulations Imposed Pursuant to Public Trust Duties Effect a
Regulatory Taking?
Having failed to prevail on its jurisdictional challenges, the Company
is left with one, last, formidable defensive strategy-a takings counter-
claim."3' The Company will rely on Nollan v California Coastal Com-
127. Id. at 814 (citing Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
128. Id. (citing Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)).
129. Id.
130. Such abstention was found proper in Morris v. City of Santa Cruz, where the court declined
to hear a state public trust claim when a state agency proceeding was still unresolved, and also in the
"interest of comity," finding it more proper for the state to hear the claim. 1994 WL 514032 at *5
(N.D. Cal. 1994).
131. Colorado River, 360 U.S. at 816.
132. A takings claim asserts that, through burdensome, constricting regulation, the government
has "taken" the claimant's property without just compensation, in violation of the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause, by lowering the value of the property or by interfering with its use. See GEORGE C.
[Vol. 1 9
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE
mission, where the Court held that imposing a public trust easement on
Nollan's waterfront property effected a compensable taking.
33
However, Nollan may be easily- distinguished. First, the Court noted
that conditioning Nollan's rebuilding permit upon the grant of a public
access easement could be lawful land-use regulation if the public purpose
justified such action.'34 However, because the conditions, placed on
Nollan had no "essential nexus" to building permit requirements, the Court
found a taking.' 35 Conversely, in our imaginary case, the essential nexus
exists, because the environmental regulations, imposed pursuant to the
public trust doctrine, do justify disapproval of the mining plan. Unlike the
permit conditions in Nollan, where the public trust was used to allow the
public unlimited access to and egress upon the claimant's property, the
Forest Service in our case would be conditioning its approval of the min-
ing plan upon the restrictions needed to protect the resources.
Because a Nollan-type situation is not presented in our case, the court
would then look to other Supreme Court takings cases for guidance. The
Court has cautioned that compensation for a regulatory taking is only
required where regulations prohibit all economically beneficial use of the
land.'36 Because the regulations in our imaginary case do not prohibit all
beneficial use of the land, but merely make it unprofitable to mine, our
court would not find the regulation to be a compensable taking. The land
may have other value beyond mining; for example, the Company could
charge for hunting access or for camping, or could contract with guide
services for excursions into this scenic, rugged landscape.
One aspect of takings jurisprudence is particularly relevant to our
imaginary case. The "nuisance exception" allows the government to regu-
late the use of property without compensation in order to prevent harm to
the public. As the Supreme Court explained, "all property in this country
is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be
injurious to the community, and the Takings Clause did not transform that
principle into one that requires compensation whenever the State asserts its
power to enforce it."'37 This exception often raises the issue whether the
regulation seeks to confer a public benefit or prevent a public harm. 38
COGGINS, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW, § 4.03 (1990).
133. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
134. Id. at 834 (citing Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978)).
135. Id. at 837; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding City's condi-
tioning of a building permit upon dedication of portion of property to storm drain system and to bicy-
cle/pedestrian path had the required nexus, but that dedication to public greenway did not have the
required reasonable relationship).
136. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (emphasis added).
137. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 470, 491-92 (1987).
138. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024-25 (Justice Scalia characterizes the distinction as often being in the
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In Smoke Rise, Inc. v Washington Suburban Sanitary Commis-
sion,'39 the court addressed this distinction. At issue were county orders
requiring a property owner to hook up to a county-operated sewer system.
The court held that such orders did not effect a taking, because they did
not create a public benefit, but rather prevented a public harm to state
rivers which the county, by virtue of the public trust doctrine, has a duty
to prevent.
The same principles apply to our imaginary case. The Forest Service
would not be seeking to set this land aside as an de facto wilderness area,
nor to enhance the public's access to the land, both of which would confer
a benefit to the public. Rather, the Forest Service would be acting in good
faith to prevent harm to public resources, just as the county was in Smoke
Rise.
Finally, the Company has no "investment-backed expectation"'40 to
use the property unfettered by regulation. The property interest in a min-
ing claim located on federal land has been characterized by the Court as
"a unique form of property ,141 Mining claimants "take their mineral in-
terests with the knowledge that the Government retains substantial regula-
tory power over those interests."' 42 Thus, our defendant is left without a
takings claim, and our imaginary plaintiff has prevailed in the last defen-
sive scrimmage.
V CONCLUSION
Scholars have forcefully argued the existence of a constitutional basis
for a federal public trust doctrine. Nonetheless, federal courts have hesitat-
ed to embrace the doctrine, presumably because it would entail the devel-
opment of federal common law in an area some courts view as occupied
by federal statutes. Yet the development of federal trust common law is
precisely what is needed in cases where no statutory scheme precisely
addresses or redresses the harm befalling valuable federal resources. Al-
though the development of a public trust duty on the part of federal agen-
cies and officials will require federal courts to bravely go where few have
gone before, no legal principles prevent them from doing so.
Understandably discouraged by the past reticence of federal courts to
impress a public trust duty on federal agencies, environmental plaintiffs
eye of the beholder).
139. 400 F Supp. 1369 (D. Md. 1975).
140. Reasonable investment-backed expectations are compensable. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019
n.8, 1034.
141. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 104 (1985) (citing Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining
Co., 371 U.S. 334, 335 (1963)).
142. Id. at 105.
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may be loath to test the waters again. However, the past need not portend
the future. As this country's resources become more and more depleted,
and'as rising demands on those remaining resources add to the pressures
placed upon all three branches of the government to protect those resourc-
es, plaintiffs may find the courts more willing to embrace the extra author-
ity offered by the public trust doctrine, to preserve those precious national
treasures that would otherwise go unprotected. As is often the case in the
development of common law, necessity may prove to be the mother of
invention.

